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ABSTRACT
We study a proof methodology for verifying the safety of data invariants of highly-
available distributed applications that replicate state. The proof is (1) modular: one can
reason about each individual operation separately, and (2) sequential: one can reason
about a distributed application as if it were sequential. We automate the methodology
and illustrate the use of the tool with a representative example.
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1 INTRODUCTION
A distributed application often replicates its data to several locations, and accesses
the closest available replica. Examples include social networks, multi-user games,
co-operative engineering tools, collaborative editors, source control repositories,
or distributed file systems. To ensure availability, an update must not synchronise
across replicas; otherwise, when a network partition occurs, the system will block.
Asynchronous updates may cause replicas to diverge or to violate the data invariants
of the application.
To address the first problem, Conflict-free Replicated Data Types (CRDTs)[13] have
mathematical properties to ensure that all replicas that have received the same set of
updates converge to the same state [13]. To ensure availability, a CRDT replica executes
both queries and updates locally and immediately, without remote synchronisation. It
propagates its updates to the other replicas asynchronously.
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There are two basic approaches to update propagation: to propagate operations, or
to propagate states. In the former approach, an update is first applied to some origin
replica, then sent as an operation to remote replicas, which in turn apply it to update
their local state. Operation-based CRDTs require the the message delivery layer to
deliver messages in causal order, exactly once; the set of replicas must be known.
In the latter approach, an update is applied to some origin replica. Occasionally,
one replica sends its full state to some other replica, which merges the received state
into its own. In turn, this replica will later send its own state to yet another replica. As
long as every update eventually reaches every replica transitively, messages may be
dropped, re-ordered or duplicated, and the set of replicas may be unknown. Replicas
are guaranteed to converge if the set of states, as a result of updates and merge, forms
a monotonic semi-lattice [13]. Due to these relaxed requirements, state-based CRDTs
have better adoption [1]. They are the focus of this work.
As a running example, consider a simple auction system. The state of an auction
consists of status, a set of bids, and a winner. This state is replicated at multiple servers;
CRDTs ensures that all replicas eventually converge. Users at different locations can
start an auction, place bids, close the auction, declare a winner, inspect the local
replica, and observe if a winner is declared and who it is. All replicas will eventually
agree on the same auction status, same set of bids and the same winner.
However, the application may also require to maintain a correctness property or
invariant over the data. An invariant is an assertion on application data that must
evaluate to true in every state of every replica. For instance, the auction’s invariant is
that: when the auction is closed, there is a winner; there is a single winner; and the
winner’s bid is the highest.
Such an invariant is easy to ensure in a sequential system, but concurrent updates
might violate it. In this case, the application would need to synchronise some updates
between replicas, in order to maintain the invariant. For instance, in the absence of
sufficient synchronisation, a replica might close the auction and declare a winner,
while concurrently a user at a different replica is placing a higher bid.
This problem has been addressed before, by stating correctness rules and proof
obligations; however, previous work considers only the operation-based approach
[6, 8, 10].
In this paper, we propose a proof methodology for applications that use state-
based CRDTs. We exploit the properties of state-based CRDTs to reason about a
concurrent system in a sequential manner. We have also developed a tool named
Soteria, to automate our proof rule. Soteria detects concurrency bugs and provides
counterexamples.
2 SYSTEM MODEL
An application consists of state, some operations, a merge function, and an invariant.
The state is replicated at any number of replicas. A client chooses any arbitrary replica
for its next operation, called the origin replica for that operation. A replica occasionally
sends its state to some other replica, which the receiving replica merges into its own
state. In summary, the state of any given replica changes, either by executing an
update operation for which it is the origin, or by merging the state received from a
remote replica. Each replica is sequential. A merge is the only point where a replica
observes concurrent operations submitted to other replicas. Each replica executes
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Figure 1: Evolution of state in an auction application
sequentially, one local update or merge at a time; equivalently, an update or merge
operation executes atomically, even if it updates multiple data items.
An application invariant is an assertion over state. The invariant must evaluate
true in every state of every replica. Despite being evaluated against local state, an
invariant is in effect global, since it must be true at all replicas, and replicas eventually
converge.
Figure 1 depicts the evolution of state in our auction application. Each line represents
a replica, time progressing from left to right. A box represents local state. A curved
arrow represents an update operation, labelled with the operation name. A diagonal
arrow shows propagation (labelled with the propagated state), merged at the receiving
replica.
We assume here that application state is a composition of CRDTs. This is not a
limitation, since many basic CRDT types have been proposed, which extend familiar
sequential data types with a concurrency semantics [12].
The CRDT convergence rules, or lattice rules, are the following. The state of a
replica progresses monotonically with time. The set of states forms a semi-lattice, i.e.,
is equipped with a partial order and a least-upper-bound function. A state transition
represents the execution of either an update operation or merge. An update is an
inflation, i.e., the resulting state is no less (in the partial order) than the previous one.
Merge computes a state which is the least-upper-bound of the current local state and
the received remote state.
We write σ for the current state of a replica, σnew for the new state after an oper-
ation or merge, and σ ′ for the incoming state from a remote replica. In the Boogie
specification language (used by our tool, described in Section 4), we denote operation
execution with the keyword call, an assertion with assert, and assumptions with
assume. An operation op executes only if its precondition is true. Thus, we can write
the above lattice conditions as follows:
• An update operation op is an inflation.
call σnew = op(σ )
assert σnew ≥ σ
• Merge is a least upper bound
call σnew = merge(σ ,σ ′)
assert σnew ≥ σ ∧ σnew ≥ σ ′ #upper bound
PaPoC’19, March 25, Dresden, Germany Sreeja S Nair, Gustavo Petri, and Marc Shapiro
assert ∀σ ∗,σ ∗ ≥ σ ∧ σ ∗ ≥ σ ′ =⇒ σ ∗ ≥ σnew #least
Let us illustrate with the auction example (for simplicity we consider a single
auction). Its state is as follows:
• Status: the status of an auction can move from its initial state, INVALID (under
preparation), to ACTIVE (can receive bids) and CLOSED (no more bids accepted),
such that INVALID < ACTIVE < CLOSED.
• Winner: The winner of the auction. It is either ⊥, initially, or the bid with the
highest amount. In case of multiple bids with same amount, the bid with the
lowest id wins. It is ordered such that ∀b ∈ Bids,⊥ ≤ b.
• Bids: Set of bids placed (initially empty)
– BidId: A unique identifier for each bid placed
– Placed: A boolean flag to indicate whether the bid has been placed or not,
ordered TRUE > FALSE. It is enabled once when the bid is placed. Once placed,
a bid cannot be withdrawn.
– Amount: An integer representing the amount of the bid; this cannot bemodified
once the bid is created.
Figure 1 illustrates how the auction state evolves over time; status, bids and winner
are represented by a circle, rectangle and a star respectively. The application state is
geo-replicated at data centres in Australia, Belgium and China.
We now specify the merge operation for an auction. We denote the receiving replica
state σ = (status, winner, Bids); the received state is denoted σ ′ = (status′, winner′,
Bids′).
merge((status ,winner ,Bids),
(status ′,winner ′,Bids ′)):
statusnew := max(status ,status ′)
if winner ′,⊥ then winnernew := winner ′
else winnernew := winner
∀b, if b ∈ Bids ∩ Bids ′ then
Bidsnew .b.placed := Bids.b.placed
∨ Bids ′.b.placed
else if b ∈ Bids ′ then
Bidsnew .b.placed := Bids
′.b.placed
else Bidsnew .b.placed := Bids.b.placed
∀b, if b ∈ Bids then
Bidsnew .b.amount := Bids.b.amount
else Bidsnew .b.amount := Bids ′.b.amount
In the absence of any extra synchronisation, it is possible to violate the invariant, as
the following execution scenario illustrates. Alice from Australia starts an auction, by
setting its status to ACTIVE (green in the figure) in the Australian replica. Henceforth,
the auction can receive bids. The Australian replica sends its updated state to the other
two replicas, which merge it into their own states. Now Bob in Belgium places a bid
for $100 (blue). This update is sent to other replicas. Charlie, in China, sees the auction
and Bob’s bid. He updates the China state with a higher bid of $105 (dotted blue),
which is sent to both other replicas. However, due to a network failure, the remote
replicas do not receive this update (red dotted lines). Meanwhile Alice, unaware of
Charlie’s bid, closes the auction and declares Bob’s bid as the winner. Later when the
network heals, the updated states are sent and merged. The auction is new closed,
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and contains Bob’s $100 bid and Charlie’s $105 bid. Unfortunately, Bob’s bid is the
winner, violating the application invariant.
In the next section, we can discuss how to ensure invariants of applications build
on top of the system model we described.
3 PROVING INVARIANTS
As explained earlier, each replica executes a sequence of state transitions, due either
to a local update, or to a merge incorporating remote updates. Thus, concurrency can
be observed only through merge.
Let us call safe state a replica state that satisfies the invariant. Assuming the current
state is safe, any update (local or merge) must result in a safe state. To ensure this,
every update is equipped with a precondition that disallows any unsafe execution.1
Thus, a local update executes only when, at the origin replica, the current state is safe
and its precondition currently holds. Similarly, merge executes only with two safe
states that together satisfy a merge precondition.
Formally, an update u (an operation or a merge), mutates the local state σ , to a new
state σnew = u(σ ). To preserve the invariant, Inv, we require that
σ ∈ Preu =⇒ u(σ ) ∈ Inv
To illustrate local preconditions, consider an operation close_auction(w: BidId),
which sets auction status to CLOSED and the winner to w. The developer may have
written a precondition such as status = ACTIVE, because closing an auction doesn’t
make sense otherwise. In order to ensure the invariant that the winner has the highest
amount, one needs to strengthen it with the clause is_highest(Bids, w), defined
as ∀b ∈ Bids : b.Amount ≤ w.Amount.
To illustrate merge precondition, consider a CRDTwhose state is the pair of integers,
σ = (n,m) ∈ N×N. It has two operations, incn and incm, that respectively increment
n orm by 1, and a merge function:
merge(σ ,σ ′) = (max(n,n′),max(m,m′))
We wish to maintain the invariant that their sum is no more than 10:
Inv ≜ (n +m) ≤ 10
The precondition of incn is Preincn ≜ (n + m) ≤ 9; similarly for incm. Starting
from a safe state (4, 5), two replicas may independently increment to states (5, 5) and
(4, 6) respectively. Both are safe. However, merging them would violate the invariant.
Therefore, merge(σ ,σ ′) must have precondition
Premerge ≜ max(n,n′) +max(m,m′) ≤ 10
Since merge can happen at any time, it must be the case that its precondition
is always true, i.e., it constitutes an additional invariant. Now our global invariant
consists of two parts: first, the application invariant, and second, the precondition of
merge. We can now state our proof rule informally as follows::2
1 Technically, this is at least the weakest-precondition of the update for the invariant. It strengthens any
a priori precondition that the developer may have set.
2 We omit the full formalisation and the proof of soundness for brevity.
PaPoC’19, March 25, Dresden, Germany Sreeja S Nair, Gustavo Petri, and Marc Shapiro
State-Based Safety Rule. Define the precondition ofmerge to be theweakest-
precondition of merge, for the application invariant. The initial state must
satisfy, and each local update ormerge operationmust preserve, the conjunc-
tion of: (i) the application invariant, and (ii) the precondition of merge. □
In our Boogie notation, each operation can be verified as follows:
assume Inv ∧ Premerge ∧ Preop
call σnew = op(σ )
assert Inv ∧ Premerge
The case of the merge function can be verified with the following condition:
assume Inv ∧ Inv′ ∧ Premerge
call σnew = merge(σ ,σ ′)
assert Inv ∧ Premerge
Note that there are two copies of state, the unprimed local state of the replica applying
the merge, and the primed state received from a remote replica. Inv′ denotes that σ ′
preserves the invariant Inv.
3.1 Applying the proof rule
Let us apply the proof methodology to the auction application. Its invariant is the
following conjunction:
(1) A bid is placed only when status is ACTIVE.
(2) And: Once a bid is placed, its amount does not change.
(3) And: There is no winner until status is CLOSED.
(4) And: There is a single winner, the bid with the highest amount (breaking ties
using the lowest identifier).
Computing the weakest-precondition of each update operation, for this invariant, is
obvious. For instance, as discussed earlier, close_auction(w: BidId) gets precon-
dition is_highest(Bids, w), because of Invariant Term 4 above.
Despite local updates to each replica preserving the invariant, Figure 1 showed
that it is susceptible of being violated by merging. This is the case if Bob’s $100 bid
in Belgium wins, even though Charlie concurrently placed a $105 bid in China; this
occurred because status became CLOSED in Belgium while still ACTIVE in China. The
weakest-precondition of merge for Term 4 expresses that, if status in either states
is CLOSED, the winner should be the bid with the highest amount in both the states.
Therefore, merge(σ ,σ ′) must have the following additional precondition:
status=CLOSED =⇒ is_highest(Bids , winner)
∧ is_highest(Bids ′, winner)
∧ status ′=CLOSED =⇒ is_highest(Bids , winner ′)
∧ is_highest(Bids ′, winner ′)
Furthermore, the code for merge uses Term 2, for which its weakest-precondition
is as follows:
∀b ∈ Bids∩Bids ′, Bids.b.amount = Bids ′.b.amount
These two merge preconditions now strengthen the global invariant, in order to
preserve safety in concurrent executions. Let us now consider how this strengthening
impacts the local update operations. Since starting the auction doesn’t modify any
bids, this operation trivially preserves it. Placing a bid might violate it, if the auction
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is concurrently closed in some other replica; conversely, closing the auction could
violate it, if a higher bid is concurrently placed in a remote replica. Thus, the auc-
tion application is safe when executed sequentially, but is unsafe when updates are
concurrent. This indicates the specification has a bug, which we now proceed to fix.
3.2 Concurrency Control for Invariant Preservation
As we discussed earlier, the preconditions of operations and merge are strengthened
in order to preserve the invariant. This provides a sequentially safe specification. An
application must also preserve the precondition of merge in order to ensure concurrent
safety. Violating this indicates the presence of a bug in the specification. In that case,
the developer needs to strengthen the application by adding appropriate concurrency
control mechanisms, ie., the operations that fail to preserve the precondition of merge
might need to synchronise. The required concurrency control mechanisms are added
as part of the state in our model. The modified application state is now composed of the
CRDTs that represents the state and the concurrency control mechanism. Together, it
behaves like a composition of state-based CRDTs. The whole state should now ensure
the lattice conditions described in section 2.
Recall that in the auction example, placing bids and closing the auction were not
preserving the precondition of merge. This requires strengthening the specification by
adding a concurrency control mechanism to restrict these operations. We can enforce
them to be strictly sequential, thereby avoiding concurrency at all. But this will affect
the availability of the application.
A concurrency control can be better designed with the workload characteristics
in mind. For this particular application, we know that placing bids are very frequent
operations than closing an auction. Hence we try to formulate a concurrency control
like a readers-writer lock. In order to realise this we distribute tokens to each replica.
As long as a replica has the token, it can allow placing bids. Closing the auction requires
recalling the tokens from all replicas. This ensures that there are no concurrent bids
placed and thus a winner can be declared, respecting the application safety.
The entire specification of the auction application can be seen in Figure 2. The
shaded lines in blue indicate the effect of adding concurrency control to the state.
An alternative approach to our treatment of concurrency control could be to consider
the invariant as a resource in the style of Concurrent Separation Logic [11]. In this
case, access to the application state, described through a separation logic invariant,
is guarded by a concurrency control mechanism (typically some form of a lock).
However, this approach is tied to separation logic reasoning, where assertions act as
resources, and allows one to distinguish local from global resources. We consider that
this was not essential for the kind of proofs that we conduct, but it might be more
promising when verifying client programs of our data types.
4 AUTOMATING THE VERIFICATION
In this section we present a tool to automate the verification of invariants as discussed
in the previous sections. Our tool, called Soteria is based on the Boogie [2] verification
framework. The input to Soteria is a specification of the application written in Boogie,
an intermediate verification language.
A specification in Soteria will consist of the following parts:
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• State: a declaration of the state. It can be a single CRDT or a composition of
CRDTs.
• Comparison function: The programmer provides a comparison function (an-
notated with keyword @gteq) that determines the partial order on states.
• Operations: The programmer provides the implementation of the operations
and their respective preconditions, Preop. Operations are encoded either imper-
atively as Boogie procedures or declaratively as postconditions.
• Merge function: The special merge operation is distinguished from the other
operations (with annotation @merge). The programmer must provide a precon-
dition to merge that is strong enough to prove the invariant.
• Application Invariant: The programmer provides the invariant (with keyword
@invariant) to be verified by the tool as a Boogie assertion over the state.
In addition, Boogie often requires additional information such as: • User-defined data
types, • Constants to declare special objects such as the origin replicame, or to bound
the quantifiers, • Axioms for inductive functions over aggregate data structures, for
instance, to compute the maximum of a set of values, • Loop invariants.
The specification of the auction application can be seen in Figure 2.
Verification
The verification of a specification is performed in multiple stages; in order:
(1) Syntactic checks: validates the specification for syntactical errors and checks
whether the pre/post conditions are sound.
(2) Compliance check: checks whether the specification provides all the elements
explained earlier.
(3) Convergence check: checks whether the specification respects the properties
of a state-based CRDT, ie., each operation inflates the state and merge is the
least upper bound.
(4) Safety check: verifies the safety of the application invariant, as discussed in
section 3. This stage is divided further into two sub-stages:
• Sequential safety: whether each individual operation (or merge) upholds the
invariant. If not, the designer needs to strengthen the precondition of the
corresponding operation (or merge)
• Concurrent safety: whether every operation (and merge) upholds the precondi-
tion of merge. Note that, while this check relates to the concurrent behaviour
of state-based CRDTs, the check itself is completely sequential, ie., it does not
require reasoning about operations performed by other processes. This check
ensures that the invariant remains safe during concurrent operation. If this
check fails, the application needs stronger concurrency control.
Each check in Soteria 3 generates counterexamples when the verification fails. These
counterexamples might guide the developer in debugging the specification according
to the verification steps.
5 RELATEDWORK
Several works have concentrated on the formalisation and specification of eventually
consistent systems [3, 4, 14]. A number of works concentrate on the specification and
3The tool alongwith some sample specifications can be accessed at https://github.com/sreeja/soteria_tool.
Invariant Safety for Distributed Applications PaPoC’19, March 25, Dresden, Germany
Initial state:
status = INVALID ∧ winner = ⊥
∧ ∄ b, Bids.b.placed
∧ ∀ r, Tokens.r = true
Comparison function:
status1 ≥ status2 ∧ (winner1,⊥ ∨ winner2=⊥)
∧∀b, (Bids1.b.placed ∨ ¬Bids2.b.placed)
∧ (∀r, ¬Tokens1.r ∨ Tokens2.r)
Invariant:
∀b, Bids.b.placed =⇒ status≥ACTIVE
∧ Bids.b.amount >0
status≤ACTIVE =⇒ winner=⊥
status=CLOSED =⇒ Bids.winner.placed
∧ is_highest(Bids , winner)
status=CLOSED =⇒ ∀r,¬Tokens.r
{Premerge:
status=CLOSED =⇒ is_highest(Bids , winner)
∧is_highest(Bids ′, winner)
∧ status ′=CLOSED =⇒ is_highest(Bids , winner ′)
∧is_highest(Bids ′, winner ′)
∧ ∀b, Bids.b.amount = Bids ′.b.amount
∧ ∀r, Tokens.r.me =⇒ Tokens ′.r.me
∧ ∀r,b, (¬Tokens.r ∧ ¬Bids.b.placed)
=⇒ ¬Bids ′.b.placed
∧ ∀ r,b, (r,me ∧ ¬Tokens.r ∧ ¬Bids.b.placed)
=⇒ ¬Bids ′.b.placed
∧ ∀ r,¬Tokens.r =⇒ winner ′=winner ∨ winner ′=⊥
∧ ∀ r, Tokens.r =⇒ winner=⊥ ∧ winner ′=⊥}
merge((status , winner , Bids , Tokens),
(status ′,winner ′,Bids ′,Tokens ′)):
<merge of status , winner , Bids as in section 2>
∀r, Tokensnew .r := Tokens.r∧Tokens ′.r
{Prestart_auction: status = INVALID ∧ winner = ⊥
∧ ∀r, Tokens.r}
start_auction ():
statusnew := ACTIVE
winnernew := ⊥
{Preplace_bid: ¬Bids.b_id.placed
∧ Bids.b_id.amount = value
∧ status = ACTIVE ∧ winner = ⊥
∧ Tokens.me}
place_bid(b_id , value):
Bidsnew .b_id.placed := true
Bidsnew .b_id.amount := value
{Preclose_auction: status = ACTIVE ∧ winner = ⊥
∧ Bids.w.placed ∧ is_highest(Bids , w)
∧ ∀r, ¬Tokens.r}
close_auction(w):
statusnew := CLOSED
winnernew := w
Figure 2: Specification of auction application
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correct implementation of CRDTs [5, 7]. Our work also verifies the CRDT (lattice)
conditions, but additionally verifies an arbitrary application invariant over a replica
state.
Gotsman et al. [6] provides a proof methodology for proving invariants of CRDTs
that propagate operations. The associated tools [8, 10] performs the check using an
SMT solver as the backend and Nair and Shapiro [9] discusses some concurrency
control suggestions by using the counterexamples generated by the failed proofs.
Gotsman et al. [6] assume that the underlying network ensures causal consistency,
and their methodology requires reasoning about concurrent behaviours. This requires
checks for each pair of operations in the application (reflected as stability verification
conditions). Gotsman et al. [6] uses an abstract notion of tokens as concurrency control
mechanisms. The operations acquire tokens in order to preserve the application
invariant.
In contrast, Soteria focuses on state-based CRDTs. We check convergence by verify-
ing the lattice conditions of section 2 and that because of the rules shown in section 3,
we can reduce the problem of verifying the invariant to sequential proof obligations.
This is reflected by the fact that all of our proofs are standard pre/post conditions
checks using the Boogie framework. Boogie framework. In contrast with Gotsman
et al. [6], Soteria includes concrete specification of concurrency control as part of the
application state.
To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first attempt in automated verification of
invariants of state-based CRDTs.
6 CONCLUSION
We have presented a proof methodology to verify invariants of state-based CRDT
implementations guaranteeing: (1) that the implementation satisfies the lattice condi-
tions of state-based CRDTs [1], and (2) that the implementation satisfies programmer
provided invariant reducing the problem to checking that each operation of the data
type satisfies a precondition of the merge function of the state.
We implemented Soteria, a tool sitting on top of the Boogie verification framework,
to specify the implementation, its invariant and validate it.
In future work, we plan to automate concurrency control synthesis. The synthesised
concurrency control can be analysed and adjusted dynamically to minimise the cost
of synchronisation. Another direction for future work can be to decouple the update
propagation mechanism of CRDT from the proof rule resulting in a generic proof rule
to verify distributed systems.
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ABSTRACT
We study a proof methodology for verifying the safety of
data invariants of highly-available distributed applications
that replicate state. The proof is (1) modular: one can reason
about each individual operation separately, and (2) sequen-
tial: one can reason about a distributed application as if it
were sequential.We automate themethodology and illustrate
the use of the tool with a representative example.
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1 INTRODUCTION
A distributed application often replicates its data to several
locations, and accesses the closest available replica. Exam-
ples include social networks, multi-user games, co-operative
engineering tools, collaborative editors, source control repos-
itories, or distributed file systems. To ensure availability,
an update must not synchronise across replicas; otherwise,
when a network partition occurs, the systemwill block. Asyn-
chronous updates may cause replicas to diverge or to violate
the data invariants of the application.
To address the first problem, Conflict-free Replicated Data
Types (CRDTs)[13] have mathematical properties to ensure
that all replicas that have received the same set of updates
converge to the same state [13]. To ensure availability, a
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CRDT replica executes both queries and updates locally and
immediately, without remote synchronisation. It propagates
its updates to the other replicas asynchronously.
There are two basic approaches to update propagation: to
propagate operations, or to propagate states. In the former
approach, an update is first applied to some origin replica,
then sent as an operation to remote replicas, which in turn
apply it to update their local state. Operation-based CRDTs
require the the message delivery layer to deliver messages in
causal order, exactly once; the set of replicas must be known.
In the latter approach, an update is applied to some origin
replica. Occasionally, one replica sends its full state to some
other replica, which merges the received state into its own.
In turn, this replica will later send its own state to yet another
replica. As long as every update eventually reaches every
replica transitively, messages may be dropped, re-ordered or
duplicated, and the set of replicas may be unknown. Replicas
are guaranteed to converge if the set of states, as a result
of updates and merge, forms a monotonic semi-lattice [13].
Due to these relaxed requirements, state-based CRDTs have
better adoption [1]. They are the focus of this work.
As a running example, consider a simple auction system.
The state of an auction consists of status, a set of bids, and a
winner. This state is replicated at multiple servers; CRDTs en-
sures that all replicas eventually converge. Users at different
locations can start an auction, place bids, close the auction,
declare a winner, inspect the local replica, and observe if a
winner is declared and who it is. All replicas will eventually
agree on the same auction status, same set of bids and the
same winner.
However, the application may also require to maintain a
correctness property or invariant over the data. An invariant
is an assertion on application data that must evaluate to true
in every state of every replica. For instance, the auction’s
invariant is that: when the auction is closed, there is a winner;
there is a single winner; and the winner’s bid is the highest.
Such an invariant is easy to ensure in a sequential system,
but concurrent updates might violate it. In this case, the ap-
plication would need to synchronise some updates between
replicas, in order to maintain the invariant. For instance, in
the absence of sufficient synchronisation, a replica might
close the auction and declare a winner, while concurrently a
user at a different replica is placing a higher bid.
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This problem has been addressed before, by stating cor-
rectness rules and proof obligations; however, previous work
considers only the operation-based approach [6, 8, 10].
In this paper, we propose a proof methodology for applica-
tions that use state-based CRDTs. We exploit the properties
of state-based CRDTs to reason about a concurrent system in
a sequential manner. We have also developed a tool named
Soteria, to automate our proof rule. Soteria detects concur-
rency bugs and provides counterexamples.
2 SYSTEM MODEL
An application consists of state, some operations, a merge
function, and an invariant. The state is replicated at any
number of replicas. A client chooses any arbitrary replica
for its next operation, called the origin replica for that oper-
ation. A replica occasionally sends its state to some other
replica, which the receiving replica merges into its own state.
In summary, the state of any given replica changes, either
by executing an update operation for which it is the ori-
gin, or by merging the state received from a remote replica.
Each replica is sequential. A merge is the only point where
a replica observes concurrent operations submitted to other
replicas. Each replica executes sequentially, one local update
or merge at a time; equivalently, an update or merge oper-
ation executes atomically, even if it updates multiple data
items.
An application invariant is an assertion over state. The
invariant must evaluate true in every state of every replica.
Despite being evaluated against local state, an invariant is in
effect global, since it must be true at all replicas, and replicas
eventually converge.
Figure 1 depicts the evolution of state in our auction appli-
cation. Each line represents a replica, time progressing from
left to right. A box represents local state. A curved arrow
represents an update operation, labelled with the operation
name. A diagonal arrow shows propagation (labelled with
the propagated state), merged at the receiving replica.
We assume here that application state is a composition
of CRDTs. This is not a limitation, since many basic CRDT
types have been proposed, which extend familiar sequential
data types with a concurrency semantics [12].
The CRDT convergence rules, or lattice rules, are the fol-
lowing. The state of a replica progresses monotonically with
time. The set of states forms a semi-lattice, i.e., is equipped
with a partial order and a least-upper-bound function. A
state transition represents the execution of either an update
operation or merge. An update is an inflation, i.e., the result-
ing state is no less (in the partial order) than the previous
one. Merge computes a state which is the least-upper-bound
of the current local state and the received remote state.
We write σ for the current state of a replica, σnew for the
new state after an operation or merge, and σ ′ for the incom-
ing state from a remote replica. In the Boogie specification
language (used by our tool, described in Section 4), we denote
operation execution with the keyword call, an assertion
with assert, and assumptions with assume. An operation
op executes only if its precondition is true. Thus, we can
write the above lattice conditions as follows:
• An update operation op is an inflation.
call σnew = op(σ )
assert σnew ≥ σ
• Merge is a least upper bound
call σnew = merge(σ , σ ′)
assert σnew ≥ σ ∧ σnew ≥ σ ′ #upper bound
assert ∀σ ∗, σ ∗ ≥ σ ∧ σ ∗ ≥ σ ′ =⇒ σ ∗ ≥ σnew #least
Let us illustrate with the auction example (for simplicity
we consider a single auction). Its state is as follows:
• Status: the status of an auction can move from its
initial state, INVALID (under preparation), to ACTIVE
(can receive bids) and CLOSED (no more bids accepted),
such that INVALID < ACTIVE < CLOSED.
• Winner: The winner of the auction. It is either ⊥, ini-
tially, or the bid with the highest amount. In case of
multiple bids with same amount, the bid with the low-
est id wins. It is ordered such that ∀b ∈ Bids,⊥ ≤ b.
• Bids: Set of bids placed (initially empty)
– BidId: A unique identifier for each bid placed
– Placed: A boolean flag to indicate whether the bid
has been placed or not, ordered TRUE > FALSE. It is
enabled once when the bid is placed. Once placed, a
bid cannot be withdrawn.
– Amount: An integer representing the amount of the
bid; this cannot be modified once the bid is created.
Figure 1 illustrates how the auction state evolves over time;
status, bids and winner are represented by a circle, rectangle
and a star respectively. The application state is geo-replicated
at data centres in Australia, Belgium and China.
We now specify the merge operation for an auction. We
denote the receiving replica state σ = (status, winner, Bids);
the received state is denoted σ ′ = (status′, winner′, Bids′).
merge((status ,winner ,Bids),
(status′,winner′,Bids′)):
statusnew := max(status ,status′)
if winner′,⊥ then winnernew := winner′
else winnernew := winner
∀b, if b ∈ Bids ∩ Bids′ then
Bidsnew .b.placed := Bids.b.placed
∨ Bids′.b.placed
else if b ∈ Bids′ then
Bidsnew .b.placed := Bids
′.b.placed
else Bidsnew .b.placed := Bids.b.placed
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Figure 1: Evolution of state in an auction application
∀b, if b ∈ Bids then
Bidsnew .b.amount := Bids.b.amount
else Bidsnew .b.amount := Bids′.b.amount
In the absence of any extra synchronisation, it is possi-
ble to violate the invariant, as the following execution sce-
nario illustrates. Alice from Australia starts an auction, by
setting its status to ACTIVE (green in the figure) in the Aus-
tralian replica. Henceforth, the auction can receive bids. The
Australian replica sends its updated state to the other two
replicas, which merge it into their own states. Now Bob in
Belgium places a bid for $100 (blue). This update is sent to
other replicas. Charlie, in China, sees the auction and Bob’s
bid. He updates the China state with a higher bid of $105
(dotted blue), which is sent to both other replicas. However,
due to a network failure, the remote replicas do not receive
this update (red dotted lines). Meanwhile Alice, unaware of
Charlie’s bid, closes the auction and declares Bob’s bid as the
winner. Later when the network heals, the updated states are
sent and merged. The auction is new closed, and contains
Bob’s $100 bid and Charlie’s $105 bid. Unfortunately, Bob’s
bid is the winner, violating the application invariant.
In the next section, we can discuss how to ensure invari-
ants of applications build on top of the system model we
described.
3 PROVING INVARIANTS
As explained earlier, each replica executes a sequence of
state transitions, due either to a local update, or to a merge
incorporating remote updates. Thus, concurrency can be
observed only through merge.
Let us call safe state a replica state that satisfies the in-
variant. Assuming the current state is safe, any update (local
or merge) must result in a safe state. To ensure this, every
update is equipped with a precondition that disallows any
unsafe execution.1 Thus, a local update executes only when,
at the origin replica, the current state is safe and its precon-
dition currently holds. Similarly, merge executes only with
two safe states that together satisfy a merge precondition.
Formally, an update u (an operation or a merge), mutates
the local state σ , to a new state σnew = u(σ ). To preserve the
invariant, Inv, we require that
σ ∈ Preu =⇒ u(σ ) ∈ Inv
To illustrate local preconditions, consider an operation
close_auction(w: BidId), which sets auction status to
CLOSED and the winner to w. The developer may have written
a precondition such as status = ACTIVE, because closing an
auction doesn’t make sense otherwise. In order to ensure the
invariant that the winner has the highest amount, one needs
to strengthen it with the clause is_highest(Bids, w), de-
fined as ∀b ∈ Bids : b.Amount ≤ w.Amount.
To illustrate merge precondition, consider a CRDT whose
state is the pair of integers, σ = (n,m) ∈ N × N. It has two
operations, incn and incm, that respectively increment n or
m by 1, and a merge function:
merge(σ ,σ ′) = (max(n,n′),max(m,m′))
We wish to maintain the invariant that their sum is no more
than 10:
Inv ≜ (n +m) ≤ 10
1 Technically, this is at least the weakest-precondition of the update for the
invariant. It strengthens any a priori precondition that the developer may
have set.
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The precondition of incn is Preincn ≜ (n +m) ≤ 9; similarly
for incm. Starting from a safe state (4, 5), two replicas may in-
dependently increment to states (5, 5) and (4, 6) respectively.
Both are safe. However, merging them would violate the
invariant. Therefore, merge(σ ,σ ′) must have precondition
Premerge ≜ max(n,n′) +max(m,m′) ≤ 10
Since merge can happen at any time, it must be the case
that its precondition is always true, i.e., it constitutes an
additional invariant. Now our global invariant consists of
two parts: first, the application invariant, and second, the
precondition of merge. We can now state our proof rule
informally as follows::2
State-Based Safety Rule. Define the precondition of
merge to be the weakest-precondition of merge, for
the application invariant. The initial state must sat-
isfy, and each local update or merge operation must
preserve, the conjunction of: (i) the application invari-
ant, and (ii) the precondition of merge. □
In our Boogie notation, each operation can be verified as
follows:
assume Inv ∧ Premerge ∧ Preop
call σnew = op(σ )
assert Inv ∧ Premerge
The case of the merge function can be verified with the fol-
lowing condition:
assume Inv ∧ Inv′ ∧ Premerge
call σnew = merge(σ , σ ′)
assert Inv ∧ Premerge
Note that there are two copies of state, the unprimed local
state of the replica applying the merge, and the primed state
received from a remote replica. Inv′ denotes that σ ′ preserves
the invariant Inv.
3.1 Applying the proof rule
Let us apply the proof methodology to the auction applica-
tion. Its invariant is the following conjunction:
(1) A bid is placed only when status is ACTIVE.
(2) And: Once a bid is placed, its amount does not change.
(3) And: There is no winner until status is CLOSED.
(4) And: There is a single winner, the bid with the highest
amount (breaking ties using the lowest identifier).
Computing the weakest-precondition of each update op-
eration, for this invariant, is obvious. For instance, as dis-
cussed earlier, close_auction(w: BidId) gets precondi-
tion is_highest(Bids, w), because of Invariant Term 4
above.
2 We omit the full formalisation and the proof of soundness for brevity.
Despite local updates to each replica preserving the invari-
ant, Figure 1 showed that it is susceptible of being violated
by merging. This is the case if Bob’s $100 bid in Belgium
wins, even though Charlie concurrently placed a $105 bid in
China; this occurred because status became CLOSED in Bel-
gium while still ACTIVE in China. The weakest-precondition
of merge for Term 4 expresses that, if status in either states
is CLOSED, the winner should be the bid with the highest
amount in both the states. Therefore, merge(σ ,σ ′)must have
the following additional precondition:
status=CLOSED =⇒ is_highest(Bids , winner)
∧ is_highest(Bids′, winner)
∧ status′=CLOSED =⇒ is_highest(Bids , winner′)
∧ is_highest(Bids′, winner′)
Furthermore, the code for merge uses Term 2, for which
its weakest-precondition is as follows:
∀b ∈ Bids∩Bids′, Bids.b.amount = Bids′.b.amount
These two merge preconditions now strengthen the global
invariant, in order to preserve safety in concurrent execu-
tions. Let us now consider how this strengthening impacts
the local update operations. Since starting the auction doesn’t
modify any bids, this operation trivially preserves it. Placing
a bid might violate it, if the auction is concurrently closed
in some other replica; conversely, closing the auction could
violate it, if a higher bid is concurrently placed in a remote
replica. Thus, the auction application is safe when executed
sequentially, but is unsafe when updates are concurrent. This
indicates the specification has a bug, which we now proceed
to fix.
3.2 Concurrency Control for Invariant
Preservation
As we discussed earlier, the preconditions of operations and
merge are strengthened in order to preserve the invariant.
This provides a sequentially safe specification. An applica-
tion must also preserve the precondition of merge in order
to ensure concurrent safety. Violating this indicates the pres-
ence of a bug in the specification. In that case, the developer
needs to strengthen the application by adding appropriate
concurrency control mechanisms, ie., the operations that fail
to preserve the precondition of merge might need to syn-
chronise. The required concurrency control mechanisms are
added as part of the state in our model. The modified applica-
tion state is now composed of the CRDTs that represents the
state and the concurrency control mechanism. Together, it
behaves like a composition of state-based CRDTs. The whole
state should now ensure the lattice conditions described in
section 2.
Recall that in the auction example, placing bids and closing
the auction were not preserving the precondition of merge.
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This requires strengthening the specification by adding a
concurrency control mechanism to restrict these operations.
We can enforce them to be strictly sequential, thereby avoid-
ing concurrency at all. But this will affect the availability of
the application.
A concurrency control can be better designed with the
workload characteristics in mind. For this particular applica-
tion, we know that placing bids are very frequent operations
than closing an auction. Hence we try to formulate a concur-
rency control like a readers-writer lock. In order to realise
this we distribute tokens to each replica. As long as a replica
has the token, it can allow placing bids. Closing the auction
requires recalling the tokens from all replicas. This ensures
that there are no concurrent bids placed and thus a winner
can be declared, respecting the application safety.
The entire specification of the auction application can be
seen in Figure 2. The shaded lines in blue indicate the effect
of adding concurrency control to the state.
An alternative approach to our treatment of concurrency
control could be to consider the invariant as a resource in the
style of Concurrent Separation Logic [11]. In this case, access
to the application state, described through a separation logic
invariant, is guarded by a concurrency control mechanism
(typically some form of a lock). However, this approach is
tied to separation logic reasoning, where assertions act as
resources, and allows one to distinguish local from global
resources.We consider that this was not essential for the kind
of proofs that we conduct, but it might be more promising
when verifying client programs of our data types.
4 AUTOMATING THE VERIFICATION
In this section we present a tool to automate the verification
of invariants as discussed in the previous sections. Our tool,
called Soteria is based on the Boogie [2] verification frame-
work. The input to Soteria is a specification of the application
written in Boogie, an intermediate verification language.
A specification in Soteria will consist of the following
parts:
• State: a declaration of the state. It can be a single CRDT
or a composition of CRDTs.
• Comparison function: The programmer provides a
comparison function (annotated with keyword @gteq)
that determines the partial order on states.
• Operations: The programmer provides the implemen-
tation of the operations and their respective precon-
ditions, Preop. Operations are encoded either impera-
tively as Boogie procedures or declaratively as post-
conditions.
• Merge function: The special merge operation is dis-
tinguished from the other operations (with annotation
@merge). The programmermust provide a precondition
to merge that is strong enough to prove the invariant.
• Application Invariant: The programmer provides
the invariant (with keyword @invariant) to be veri-
fied by the tool as a Boogie assertion over the state.
In addition, Boogie often requires additional information
such as: • User-defined data types, • Constants to declare
special objects such as the origin replicame, or to bound the
quantifiers, • Axioms for inductive functions over aggregate
data structures, for instance, to compute the maximum of a
set of values, • Loop invariants.
The specification of the auction application can be seen
in Figure 2.
Verification
The verification of a specification is performed in multiple
stages; in order:
(1) Syntactic checks: validates the specification for syn-
tactical errors and checks whether the pre/post condi-
tions are sound.
(2) Compliance check: checks whether the specification
provides all the elements explained earlier.
(3) Convergence check: checks whether the specifica-
tion respects the properties of a state-based CRDT, ie.,
each operation inflates the state and merge is the least
upper bound.
(4) Safety check: verifies the safety of the application in-
variant, as discussed in section 3. This stage is divided
further into two sub-stages:
• Sequential safety: whether each individual operation
(or merge) upholds the invariant. If not, the designer
needs to strengthen the precondition of the corre-
sponding operation (or merge)
• Concurrent safety: whether every operation (and
merge) upholds the precondition of merge. Note that,
while this check relates to the concurrent behaviour
of state-based CRDTs, the check itself is completely
sequential, ie., it does not require reasoning about
operations performed by other processes. This check
ensures that the invariant remains safe during con-
current operation. If this check fails, the application
needs stronger concurrency control.
Each check in Soteria 3 generates counterexamples when
the verification fails. These counterexamples might guide
the developer in debugging the specification according to
the verification steps.
3The tool along with some sample specifications can be accessed at https:
//github.com/sreeja/soteria_tool.
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Initial state:
status = INVALID ∧ winner = ⊥
∧ ∄ b, Bids.b.placed
∧ ∀ r, Tokens.r = true
Comparison function:
status1 ≥ status2 ∧ (winner1,⊥ ∨ winner2=⊥)
∧∀b, (Bids1.b.placed ∨ ¬Bids2.b.placed)
∧ (∀r, ¬Tokens1.r ∨ Tokens2.r)
Invariant:
∀b, Bids.b.placed =⇒ status≥ACTIVE
∧ Bids.b.amount >0
status≤ACTIVE =⇒ winner=⊥
status=CLOSED =⇒ Bids.winner.placed
∧ is_highest(Bids , winner)
status=CLOSED =⇒ ∀r,¬Tokens.r
{Premerge:
status=CLOSED =⇒ is_highest(Bids , winner)
∧is_highest(Bids′, winner)
∧ status′=CLOSED =⇒ is_highest(Bids , winner′)
∧is_highest(Bids′, winner′)
∧ ∀b, Bids.b.amount = Bids′.b.amount
∧ ∀r, Tokens.r.me =⇒ Tokens′.r.me
∧ ∀r,b, (¬Tokens.r ∧ ¬Bids.b.placed)
=⇒ ¬Bids′.b.placed
∧ ∀ r,b, (r,me ∧ ¬Tokens.r ∧ ¬Bids.b.placed)
=⇒ ¬Bids′.b.placed
∧ ∀ r,¬Tokens.r =⇒ winner′=winner ∨ winner′=⊥
∧ ∀ r, Tokens.r =⇒ winner=⊥ ∧ winner′=⊥}
merge((status , winner , Bids , Tokens),
(status′,winner′,Bids′,Tokens′)):
<merge of status , winner , Bids as in section 2>
∀r, Tokensnew .r := Tokens.r∧Tokens′.r
{Prestart_auction: status = INVALID ∧ winner = ⊥
∧ ∀r, Tokens.r}
start_auction ():
statusnew := ACTIVE
winnernew := ⊥
{Preplace_bid: ¬Bids.b_id.placed
∧ Bids.b_id.amount = value
∧ status = ACTIVE ∧ winner = ⊥
∧ Tokens.me}
place_bid(b_id , value):
Bidsnew .b_id.placed := true
Bidsnew .b_id.amount := value
{Preclose_auction: status = ACTIVE ∧ winner = ⊥
∧ Bids.w.placed ∧ is_highest(Bids , w)
∧ ∀r, ¬Tokens.r}
close_auction(w):
statusnew := CLOSED
winnernew := w
Figure 2: Specification of auction application
5 RELATEDWORK
Several works have concentrated on the formalisation and
specification of eventually consistent systems [3, 4, 14]. A
number of works concentrate on the specification and cor-
rect implementation of CRDTs [5, 7]. Our work also verifies
the CRDT (lattice) conditions, but additionally verifies an
arbitrary application invariant over a replica state.
Gotsman et al. [6] provides a proof methodology for prov-
ing invariants of CRDTs that propagate operations. The asso-
ciated tools [8, 10] performs the check using an SMT solver
as the backend and Nair and Shapiro [9] discusses some con-
currency control suggestions by using the counterexamples
generated by the failed proofs. Gotsman et al. [6] assume
that the underlying network ensures causal consistency, and
their methodology requires reasoning about concurrent be-
haviours. This requires checks for each pair of operations
in the application (reflected as stability verification condi-
tions). Gotsman et al. [6] uses an abstract notion of tokens
as concurrency control mechanisms. The operations acquire
tokens in order to preserve the application invariant.
In contrast, Soteria focuses on state-based CRDTs. We
check convergence by verifying the lattice conditions of sec-
tion 2 and that because of the rules shown in section 3, we
can reduce the problem of verifying the invariant to sequen-
tial proof obligations. This is reflected by the fact that all
of our proofs are standard pre/post conditions checks using
the Boogie framework. Boogie framework. In contrast with
Gotsman et al. [6], Soteria includes concrete specification of
concurrency control as part of the application state.
To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first attempt in
automated verification of invariants of state-based CRDTs.
6 CONCLUSION
We have presented a proof methodology to verify invariants
of state-based CRDT implementations guaranteeing: (1) that
the implementation satisfies the lattice conditions of state-
based CRDTs [1], and (2) that the implementation satisfies
programmer provided invariant reducing the problem to
checking that each operation of the data type satisfies a
precondition of the merge function of the state.
We implemented Soteria, a tool sitting on top of the Boogie
verification framework, to specify the implementation, its
invariant and validate it.
In future work, we plan to automate concurrency con-
trol synthesis. The synthesised concurrency control can be
analysed and adjusted dynamically to minimise the cost of
synchronisation. Another direction for future work can be
to decouple the update propagation mechanism of CRDT
from the proof rule resulting in a generic proof rule to verify
distributed systems.
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